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Abstract 
 
This chapter overviews the legal issues arising from the modification of the Sony PlayStation 
console under Australian Copyright Law - the so called anti-circumvention provisions. It will 
explain how these provisions have been interpreted by the courts and focus on the very recent 
decision of the Australian High Court.  The article concludes by examining the extent to 
which the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) will impact upon this area of law. 
 
Fearing the death of copyright in the digital networks of the Internet, states of the 
world agreed in Article 11, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 19961 to pass laws that 
would prohibit circumvention of (through hacking or interfering with)  technological 
measures (DRM) used to protect copyright information e.g. passwords, and copy 
controls. These laws, known as anti-circumvention laws, are epitomized by the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (DMCA) in the USA and a similar set of 
provisions in the amended Australian Copyright Act 1968.  The US case that brought 
anti-circumvention laws to the fore was Universal City Studios Inc v Reimerdes2. In 
that case hackers posted software code (DeCSS) on websites that explained how to 
circumvent technological protection or encryption known as the Content Scrambling 
System (CSS). This encryption system is employed by the movie industry to regulate 
the usage of movies distributed on DVD. The Internet identities that distributed the 
decrypting code claimed that DeCSS allowed people to play DVDs on the free 
software platform GNU Linux and that this implemented digital choice or diversity.3 
However, the US court held that posting of the decrypting code on a website, 
including linking to a website, in certain circumstances was “providing or otherwise 
trafficking” in a circumvention device.  
 
The first installment in the Australian chapter of this story is the decision in Kabushiki 
Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens4, which is a part of world wide 
litigation concerning the Sony PlayStation2 console.      
 
 
                                                 
1 See also art 18 WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty 1996 (WPPT) 
2 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [affirmed on Appeal: Universal City Studios Inc v Corley 273 
F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001)] 
3 B. Fitzgerald, "Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Architecture (including Software): The 
Question of Digital Diversity?" [2001] EIPR 121 
4 [2002] FCA 906; [2003] FCAFC 157 
The Australian PlayStation Case 
 
Eddie Stevens who was involved in the computer games industry in Sydney was sued 
by Sony pursuant to the anti-circumvention provisions of the Australian Copyright 
Act for modifying the Sony PlayStation (PS) computer games platform or console to 
allow it more functionality.  In particular Sony argued that Stevens had breached s 
116A of the Copyright Act 1968 in that he had sold or distributed a circumvention 
device, namely mod chips, which he knew or ought reasonably have known would be 
used as a circumvention device. A circumvention device as defined by the Copyright 
Act, is something that has little other purpose than to circumvent a technological 
protection measure (TPM). A technological protection measure is something that is 
designed to prevent access to, or copying of copyright subject matter. In this case the 
mod chips were alleged to have the purpose of circumventing Regional Access 
Coding - as activated by the Boot Rom - the technological protection measure.5 
 
The Technology 
 
The Sony PlayStation is one of the most popular computer games consoles or 
platforms in the world. When a person wants to play a game they insert a disc into the 
PlayStation much like inserting a musical disc into a CD player.  The PlayStation is 
coded (through what is called Regional Access Coding (RAC) contained within a 
track on each CD read by a chip known as a “Boot ROM” located on the circuit board 
of the PlayStation console (hereafter called “RAC/Boot Rom”)) to play games 
available in the region in which the PlayStation was sold.  This means that a game 
purchased in the USA or Japan cannot be played on a PlayStation purchased in 
Australia; the platform will not support it. As well a copied, burnt or unauthorised 
version of a game will not play on the PlayStation, as the copying process does not 
embed the necessary coding in the copy. As a consequence of consumers seeking 
greater choice of digital products or digital diversity, a device known as the “mod 
chip” or “converter” surfaced in the market place. It extended the functionality of the 
PlayStation allowing games from other regions as well as copied, unauthorised or 
burnt games to be played on the PlayStation.  
 
The Digital Agenda Amendments: Anti-Circumvention Law  
 
This was the first case to consider the anti-circumvention law introduced by the 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda Act) 2000. Section 116A Copyright Act, 
effective 4th March 2001, introduced the anti-circumvention notion enshrined in art 11 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) into Australian law.  The section states: 
 
Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), this section applies if:  
(a)  a work or other subject-matter is protected by a technological protection 
 measure; and  
(b) a person does any of the following acts without the permission of the owner or 
exclusive licensee of the copyright in the work or other subject-matter:  
(i) makes a circumvention device capable of circumventing, or 
facilitating the circumvention of, the technological protection 
measure; 
                                                 
5 [2002] FCA 906 at  [24] 
(ii) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire 
or otherwise promotes, advertises or markets such a circumvention 
device; 
(iii) distributes such a circumvention device for the purpose of trade, or for 
any other purpose that will affect prejudicially the owner of the 
copyright;  
(iv)  exhibits such a circumvention device in public by way of trade;  
(v)  imports such a circumvention device into Australia for the purpose of:  
(A)  selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or 
exposing for sale or hire or otherwise promoting, advertising or 
marketing, the device; or  
(B)  distributing the device for the purpose of trade, or for any 
other purpose that will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright; 
or  
(C)  exhibiting the device in public by way of trade;  
(vi)  makes such a circumvention device available online to an extent that 
will affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright;  
(vii)  provides, or by way of trade promotes, advertises or markets, a 
circumvention service capable of circumventing, or facilitating the 
circumvention of, the technological protection measure; and  
(iv) the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the device 
or service would be used to circumvent, or facilitate the circumvention 
of, the technological protection measure. 
  
A technological protection measure (TPM) is defined under s 10 (1) Copyright Act 
as: 
 
A device or product, or a component incorporated into a process, that is designed, in the 
ordinary course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright in a work 
or other subject-matter by either or both of the following means:  
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other subject matter is available solely by use of an 
access code or process (including decryption, unscrambling or other transformation of the 
work or other subject-matter) with the authority of the owner or exclusive licensee of the 
copyright;  
(b) through a copy control mechanism.  
 
A circumvention device is also defined in s 10 (1) Copyright Act as: 
 
A device (including a computer program) having only a limited commercially significant 
purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other than the circumvention, or facilitating the 
circumvention, of an technological protection measure. 
 
Section 116A (5) creates the civil cause of action against the infringer: 
 
If this section applies, the owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright may bring an action 
against the person. 
 
 
The First Instance Decision in the Federal Court on s 116A – RAC/Boot Rom is not a 
TPM and Therefore the Mod Chip is not a Circumvention Device 
 
At first instance Sackville J held that Regional Access Coding (RAC)/Boot Rom was 
not a technological protection measure because it did not and was not designed to 
prevent access to the copyright content or to act as a copy control mechanism of the 
copyright content. The crucial finding being that RAC/Boot Rom did not prevent 
reproduction of a game, it only prevented use of a game that was not coded for the 
region in which the PlayStation was sold.6  Therefore, the mod chip could not be a 
circumvention device because it was not designed for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological protection measure.7  Sackville J rejected the argument that RAC/Boot 
Rom had the “practical effect” of inhibiting or preventing access or copying in that it 
created a disincentive for copying by making it difficult for copied games to be 
played. He explained: 
 
There seems to be nothing in the legislative history to support the view that a technological 
measure is to receive legal protection from circumvention devices if the only way in which 
the measure prevents or inhibits the infringement of copyright is by discouraging 
infringements of copyright which predate the attempt to gain access to the work or to copy 
it.8   
 
However the Judge did comment that if RAC/Boot Rom were a TPM then the mod 
chip would have satisfied the definition of a circumvention device.9 Further, Justice 
Sackville rejected a submission from the ACCC that in order for a device to be a 
“technological protection measure”, its sole purpose must be to prevent or inhibit 
infringement of copyright, noting that a TPM may have a dual purpose.10 
 
The more complex argument made by Sony was that RAC/Boot Rom was a TPM 
because it prevented copies of the games being made in the RAM (Random Access 
Memory) or temporary memory of the PlayStation console.11  The Judge rejected this 
argument predominantly on the basis that reproduction in RAM was of such a limited 
and temporary nature that it was not reproduction “in a material form” as required by 
s 31 (1) (a) (i) Copyright Act.12   
 
Sony continued this line of reasoning and alleged that playing PlayStation games 
created a copy of a cinematographic film in RAM. This argument was also rejected, 
explicitly on the ground that a substantial part of the film was not copied in RAM and 
implicitly because the film was not “embodied” in RAM.13   
 
The reasoning of Sackville J in Stevens along with that of Emmett J of the Federal 
Court in Australian Video Retailers Association v Warner Home Video Pty Ltd14 
                                                 
6 [2002] FCA 906 at  [92, 118] 
7 cf. Sony v Gamemasters 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sony Computer Entertainment v Owen 
[2002] EWHC 45; Sony v Ball [2004] EWHC 1738 (Ch); B Esler, “Judas or Messiah: The Implication 
of the Mod Chip Cases for Copyright in an Electronic Age” (2004) 1 Hertfordshire L J 1 
http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uhinfo/library/u20277_3.pdf  See also an Italian decision (Court of Bolzano) 
on the legality of the mod chip at:  http://www.alcei.it/english/actions/psmodchip.htm 
 
8 [2002] FCA 906 at  [117] 
9 [2002] FCA 906 at  [167] 
10 [2002] FCA 906 at [104] 
11 [2002] FCA 906 at  [119 ff] 
12 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137] 
13  [2002] FCA 906 at [158]-[160] 
14 (2001) 53 IPR 242 at 262-3 
establish a principle that reproduction of a computer program in RAM will not be 
regarded as an infringing reproduction for the purposes of the Copyright Act unless it 
is reproduced in a manner and on a technology that will allow that temporary 
reproduction to be captured and further reproduced.15 The message being that 
“use/playing” of a computer game is not of itself an infringement under the Copyright 
Act.    
 
The Full Federal Court – RAC/Boot Rom is a TPM and the Mod Chip is a 
Circumvention Device 
 
On 30 July 2003, the Full Federal Court of Australia (French, Lindgren and 
Finkelstein JJ) overturned the decision of Sackville J at first instance, and held that 
the sale and distribution of PlayStation mod chips contravened s116A of the 
Copyright Act. The Court held that Regional Access Coding (RAC) embedded on 
PlayStation Games and activated by the Boot Rom chip on the circuit board of the 
PlayStation console was a technological protection measure for the purposes of s 
116A Copyright Act even though it did not prevent copying as such but merely 
provided a disincentive for copying or burning games – the so called “practical effect 
argument”.16 
 
In the words of Lindgren J: 
 
If, as in the present case, the owner of copyright in a computer program devises a technological 
measure which has the purpose of inhibiting infringement of that copyright, the legislature 
intended that measure to be protected (subject to any express exception), even though the 
inhibition is indirect and operates prior to the hypothetical attempt at access and the hypothetical 
operation of the circumvention device. By ensuring that access to the program is not available 
except by use of the Boot ROM, or the access code embedded in the PlayStation games, or both in 
combination, Sony's measure does inhibit the infringement of copyright in the PlayStation games 
in that way. 17  
 
 
Likewise French J explained: 
 
If a device such as an access code on a CD-ROM in conjunction with a Boot ROM in the 
PlayStation console renders the infringing copies of computer games useless, then it would prevent 
infringement by rendering the sale of the copy “impracticable or impossible by anticipatory 
action”.18 
 
 
                                                 
15 [2002] FCA 906 at  [137, 147-8, 150] This position has now changed as a result of  Article 17.4.1 of 
the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement which obliges Australia to enact laws giving copyright owners 
the right to prohibit all types of reproduction, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary. This  
change is implemented under the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which 
came into effect on 1 January 2005. The Act amends the definition of ‘material form’ and ‘copy’ in 
section 10 of the Act and creates an exception to infringement where the reproduction is made as part 
of the technical process of using a non-infringing copy of the copyright material (see ss 43B and 
111B). The critical difference being that temporary reproduction of a whole or substantial part of a 
computer program (game) or film (game) in RAM generated from an infringing copy of the copyright 
material will be unlawful. 
16 Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment v Stevens [2003] FCAFC 157 at [20], [139], [189]. 
17 Per Lindgren J at [139]  
18 At [20]; 
However in obiter the majority (French and Lindgren JJ, Finkelstein J dissenting) 
supported Sackville J’s holding that playing a PlayStation game and reproducing it 
temporarily in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the PlayStation console  did 
not amount to a reproduction in a material form for the purposes of the Copyright 
Act.19 Once again in obiter the majority (French and Lindgren JJ, Finkelstein J 
dissenting) supporting Sackville J’s decision, apparently with slightly different 
reasoning,  held that there is not a copy of cinematographic film made in RAM when 
a game is played, because there is no “embodiment in an article” as defined by ss 10 
and  24 Copyright Act.20 
 
The case was appealed to the High Court of Australia.21    
 
The High Court   – RAC/Boot Rom is not a TPM and Therefore the Mod Chip is not a 
Circumvention Device 
 
The High Court rejected the holding of the Full Federal Court that RAC/Boot ROM 
was a TPM and confirmed the reasoning of Justice Sackville to find that Eddie 
Stevens was not liable for infringement of s 116A of the Australian Copyright Act.22   
The Court also agreed with Sackville J and the majority in the Full Federal Court that 
Sony’s arguments based on temporary reproduction in RAM could not be sustained.23 
 
The majority judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained 
that Justice Sackville’s interpretation was correct for the following reasons: 
 
It is important to understand that the reference to the undertaking of acts which, if carried out, 
would or might infringe, is consistent with the fundamental notion that copyright comprises the 
exclusive right to do any one or more of "acts" primarily identified in ss 31 and 85-88 of the Act. 
The definition of "technological protection measure" proceeds on the footing that, but for the 
operation of the device or product or component incorporated into a process, there would be no 
technological or mechanical barrier to "access" the copyright material or to make copies of the 
work after "access" has been gained. The term "access" as used in the definition is not further 
explained in the legislation. It may be taken to identify placement of the addressee in a position 
where, but for the "technological protection measure", the addressee would be in a position to 
infringe.  
This construction of the definition is assisted by a consideration of the "permitted purpose" 
qualifications to the prohibitions imposed by s 116A(1). First, s 116A(3) provides that, in certain 
circumstances, the section does not apply in relation to the supply of a circumvention device "to a 
person for use for a permitted purpose". The term "supply" means selling the circumvention 
device, letting it for hire, distributing it or making it available online (s 116A(8)). Secondly, 
                                                 
19 At [168] [26]; cf  [208-210]  
20 At [181-3], [26]; cf. [222-4] 
21 See B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the Digital 
Consumer’s Liberty or Copyright Menace/Circumvention Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89  
 
 
22 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58 
23 All judges made detailed comments regarding the method of statutory interpretation: [30]-[34] per 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ; [124]- [127] per McHugh J; [168]-[169], [215]-[219] 
per Kirby J. 
s 116A(4) states that the section in certain circumstances does not apply in relation to the making 
or importing of a circumvention device "for use only for a permitted purpose".  
The expression "permitted purpose" in sub-ss (3) and (4) has the content given it by sub-s (7). This 
states that for the purposes of s 116A, a circumvention device is taken to be used for a permitted 
purpose only if two criteria are met. The first criterion is that the device be "used for the purpose of 
doing an act comprised in the copyright in a work or other subject-matter" (emphasis added). The 
second criterion is that the doing of that act otherwise comprised in the copyright is rendered not 
an infringement by reason of the operation of one or more of the exculpatory provisions then set 
out. (The listed provisions do not include the general fair-dealing exculpations in ss 40, 41 and 42 
of the Act.)  
The first criterion in s 116A(7) for reliance upon the permitted purpose provisions which are an 
answer to what would otherwise be a claim under s 116A thus in terms links the use of a 
circumvention device to the doing of one or more of the acts enumerated in s 31 of the Act (where 
these are done in relation to a work) and in ss 85-88 (where these are done in relation to subject-
matter other than a work).  
If the construction of the definition for which Sony contends were accepted despite the linkage 
specified in s 116A(7) between the use of a circumvention device and the central provisions of 
ss 31 and 85-88 of the Act, the permitted purpose provisions would risk stultification. The facts of 
the present case are in point. The use of Mr Stevens' mod chip in order to circumvent the 
protections provided by (a) the access code on a CD-ROM in which a PlayStation game is stored 
and (b) the boot ROM device contained within the PlayStation console cannot be said to be for the 
"purpose" of reproducing a computer game within the sense of s 31 of the Act. Any such 
reproduction will already have been made through the ordinary process of "burning" the CD-
ROM. The mod chip is utilised for a different purpose, namely to access the reproduced computer 
program and thereafter visually to apprehend the result of the exercise of the functions of the 
program.24  
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained that in ‘choosing between a 
relatively broad and a relatively narrow construction of legislation, it is desirable to 
take into account its penal character.’ While this was not a criminal proceeding the 
judges stated that the potential for criminal sanction called for caution in ‘accepting 
any loose, albeit ‘practical’’construction of the section.25  They added that:  
……….. in construing a definition which focuses on a device designed to prevent or inhibit the 
infringement of copyright, it is important to avoid an overbroad construction which would extend 
the copyright monopoly rather than match it. A defect in the construction rejected by Sackville J is 
that its effect is to extend the copyright monopoly by including within the definition not only 
technological protection measures which stop the infringement of copyright, but also devices 
which prevent the carrying out of conduct which does not infringe copyright and is not otherwise 
unlawful. One example of that conduct is playing in Australia a program lawfully acquired in the 
United States. It was common ground in the courts below and in argument in this Court that this 
act would not of itself have been an infringement. [Footnotes omitted]26 
 
In finally disposing of the issue and settling the meaning of the word ‘inhibit’ Gleeson 
CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ explained: 
… Sony contended that, unless the term "inhibit" had the meaning given by the Full Court, it was 
otiose, adding nothing to "prevent". One meaning of "inhibit" indeed is "prevent". However, it may 
                                                 
24 Ibid at [39]-[43] 
25 Ibid at [45] 
26 Ibid at [47] 
be taken that "inhibit" is used in the definition of "technological protection measure" in one of its 
weaker senses, while still necessarily attached to an act of infringement. One such sense has been 
given above with respect to acts of secondary infringement by dealing in an article created by an 
act of primary infringement. Further, the operation of a copy control mechanism to impair the 
quality or limit the quantity of a reproduction may be said to hinder the act of infringement. In that 
regard, there is a legislative antecedent in s 296 of the 1988 UK Act. This, it will be recalled, 
spoke of devices or means intended "to impair" the quality of copies made. In the present case, the 
Sony device does not interfere with the making of a perfect copy of Sony's copyright in its 
computer program or cinematograph film.27 
 
They also noted that the definition of TPM was a compromise between the respective 
interests and that “there was a reluctance to give to copyright owners a form of broad 
“access control” and “this reluctance is manifest in the inclusion in the definition of 
“technological protection measure” of the concept of prevention or inhibition of 
infringement.”28   
 
McHugh J explained that ‘a device is a device that is "designed ... to ... inhibit" 
copyright if the device functions, ….so as to make the doing of an act of copyright 
infringement - not impossible - but more difficult than it would be if the device did 
not operate’29 He went on to further explain this notion by way of examples:   
This interpretation does not render the term "inhibit" redundant because it applies to at least 
two categories of devices that do not have an absolute preventative effect on copyright 
infringement. Thus, there are protective devices that regulate a user's access, not to the work 
itself, but to the appliance through which works are accessed. For example, "device binding" 
is a measure through which the decryption key of a work is linked to the "unique identifier" of 
the computer of a person who is licensed to download and copy a work. The work may only 
be downloaded and saved (and thus, copied) onto a computer with this identifier. The fact that 
access to the work is available solely by use of a decryption key that is linked to the 
computer's identifier does not make it impossible for another user of the same computer - who 
has not been licensed to reproduce the material - to download and save the work. Nonetheless, 
in disenabling the access of all other computers to the work, "device binding" mechanisms 
function to make it more difficult for users - who are not licensed to download the work - to 
have access to an appliance that will enable the copying and infringement of copyright in the 
work. In this way, "device binding" inhibits, but does not prevent, copyright infringement.  
Other devices are designed to make it impossible to do an act of copyright infringement by a 
particular method or methods, but are ineffective to prevent the doing of the same infringing 
act by other, more complex, methods. Online access controls are an example. They are 
measures that decrypt a work that is delivered to the computer through the Internet - 
"streamed" - when it is delivered to the computer. The work is then immediately re-encrypted, 
so as to enable only a small portion of the work to be decrypted at any given time. The result 
is that the work cannot be digitally copied onto the computer to which it is being delivered. 
However, the re-encryption of the work, after it has been delivered and played, does not 
restrain the user from reproducing the work on other recording devices while the work is 
being played. In making it impossible to do an act of copyright infringement (ie reproduction) 
using one method, but not making it impossible to do the same act of copyright infringement 
using a more tedious method, online access controls make it more difficult to reproduce the 
work.30 [Footnotes omitted] 
                                                 
27 Ibid at [55] See also [51]-[52] 
28 Ibid at [49] 
29 Ibid at [139] 
30 Ibid at [139]-[143] 
McHugh J concluded by saying that ‘if the definition of TPM were to be read 
expansively, so as to include devices designed to prevent access to material, with no 
inherent or necessary link to the prevention or inhibition of infringement of copyright, 
this would expand the ambit of the definition beyond that naturally indicated by the 
text’ of the Act.’ 31  
 
Kirby J explained that as Parliament had chosen such an elaborate and a specific 
definition a court should be careful to respect this design. He added that the ‘difficulty 
with Sony's interpretation is that it challenges the very assumption upon which the 
definition of TPM in terms of "devices" would operate to have the designated effect, 
namely the prevention or inhibition of the infringement of copyright.’32 He explained:  
The inclusion of the word "inhibit", in the context of a focus upon a self-operating device, 
does not alter this conclusion. A strict interpretation does not deprive the term "inhibit" in s 
10(1) of meaningful content. That word still has work to do in a number of contexts that are 
not covered by the word "prevent". For example, it will apply to a protective device which 
regulates access to the mechanism that provides access to a work, rather than access to the 
work itself. Such a device will not prevent infringement in all cases. This is because a device 
limiting access to a work does not prevent infringing copies being made once access is 
legitimately achieved. However, by restricting access to the work in the first place, such a 
device makes infringement more difficult. Significantly, such an inhibition operates 
prospectively; the infringement against which the device is designed to protect occurs 
subsequent to the operation of the protection device in its ordinary course. … Secondly, a 
device that prevents infringement by a particular method, but which is ineffective to protect 
against infringement by another more complex or involved method, is a device that will not be 
covered by the term "prevent" in s 10(1). This is because infringement will still be possible, 
through the more complex method, notwithstanding the operation of the device. However, by 
making infringement more difficult (say by preventing a common or easily available method 
of infringement), such a device can be seen to inhibit infringement in the technical sense 
required by the definition. This further demonstrates the utility of the inclusion of the term 
"inhibit" in s 10(1), consistent with the strict interpretation that I favour.  
Had it been the purpose of the Parliament, by the enactment of the Digital Agenda Act, to 
create a right to control access generally, it had the opportunity to say so. It even had overseas 
precedents upon which it could draw. The Australian Government was pressed to provide 
protection for all devices that "control access". This is evident in the definition of TPM 
suggested to the Australian Parliamentary Committee by the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance. Such a definition would effectively have mirrored the provision adopted by 
the Congress of the United States in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. By the 
time the Australian definition of TPM was enacted, the United States Act had been in force for 
two years. Nevertheless, the propounded definition of wider ambit was not accepted. Instead, 
in Australia, the Parliament chose to focus its definition upon protection from infringement of 
copyright as such.  
The preference inherent in the Australian Act has been viewed as one which "favours the use 
of protected works", by limiting the operation of TPMs in terms of control over infringement 
of copyright rather than a potentially broader control over access. When the competing 
legislation of other jurisdictions, giving effect to the relevant international treaties, is 
contrasted, it appears clear that the distinctive statutory formula adopted in Australia was a 
deliberate one. [Footnotes omitted] 33 
Kirby J reinforced his interpretation by stating that: 
                                                 
31 Ibid at [143] 
32 Ibid at [204] 
33 Ibid at [204]-[209] 
 
Avoiding over-wide operation: There is an additional reason for preferring the more confined 
interpretation of the definition of TPM in the Copyright Act. This is because the wider view 
urged by Sony would have the result of affording Sony, and other rights holders in its 
position, a de facto control over access to copyrighted works or materials that would permit 
the achievement of economic ends additional to, but different from, those ordinarily protected 
by copyright law. If the present case is taken as an illustration, Sony's interpretation would 
permit the effective enforcement, through a technological measure, of the division of global 
markets designated by Sony. It would have the effect of imposing, at least potentially, 
differential price structures in those separate markets. In short, it would give Sony broader 
powers over pricing of its products in its self-designated markets than the Copyright Act in 
Australia would ordinarily allow 
Upholding fundamental rights: A further reason, not wholly unconnected with the last, is 
relevant to the choice to be made in selecting between the competing interpretations of the 
definition of TPM. …The Full Court's broader view gives an undifferentiated operation to the 
provisions of s 116A that clearly impinges on what would otherwise be the legal rights of the 
owner of a Sony CD ROM and PlayStation console to copy the same for limited purposes and 
to use and modify the same for legitimate reasons, as in the pursuit of that person's ordinary 
rights as the owner of chattels ….  Take, for example, the case earlier mentioned of a 
purchaser of a Sony CD ROM in Japan or the United States who found, on arrival in 
Australia, that he or she could not play the game on a Sony PlayStation console purchased in 
Australia. In the case postulated, there is no obvious copyright reason why the purchaser 
should not be entitled to copy the CD ROM and modify the console in such a way as to enjoy 
his or her lawfully acquired property without inhibition. Yet, on Sony's theory of the 
definition of TPM in s 10(1) of the Copyright Act, it is able to enforce its division of global 
markets by a device ostensibly limited to the protection of Sony against the infringement of its 
copyright.  
The provisions of the Australian Constitution affording the power to make laws with respect 
to copyright operate in a constitutional and legal setting that normally upholds the rights of the 
individual to deal with his or her property as that individual thinks fit. In that setting, absent 
the provision of just terms, the individual is specifically entitled not to have such rights 
infringed by federal legislation in a way that amounts to an impermissible inhibition upon 
those rights constituting an acquisition. This is not the case in which to explore the limits that 
exist in the powers of the Australian Parliament, by legislation purporting to deal with the 
subject matter of copyright, to encumber the enjoyment of lawfully acquired chattel property 
in the supposed furtherance of the rights of copyright owners. However, limits there are. 
[Footnotes omitted]34  
The legislative option: An additional consideration for avoiding reversal of the Sony rule in 
the United States Supreme Court was mentioned by Breyer J in the recent opinion to which I 
have referred. This was, as the decision in Sony in that Court had earlier recognised, that "the 
legislative option remains available. Courts are less well suited than Congress to the task of 
'accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.'"  In the Australian context, the inevitability of further 
legislation on the protection of technology with TPMs was made clear by reference to the 
provisions of, and some legislation already enacted for, the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement. Provisions in that Agreement, and likely future legislation, impinge upon the 
subject matters of this appeal. Almost certainly they will require the attention of the Australian 
Parliament in the foreseeable future.  [Footnotes omitted]35 
The Effect of Australian –US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) on the Stevens v 
Sony Decision 
 
                                                 
34 Ibid at [213]–[216] 
35 Ibid. at [222]-[225] 
Background 
 
 
The existing definition of TPM by including the words “prevents or inhibits 
infringement of copyright” is said to be narrower in effect than a provision that 
“controls access” without any reference to copyright infringement. At the time of 
enactment submissions were made by the International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA) to the House of Representatives Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee 
(this Committee) that the definition of a TPM in the form of an “access control” 
should not be linked to copyright infringement.36 It was argued that access controls 
should be reinforced by anti-circumvention law even if they do not prevent or inhibit 
infringement of copyright. The “real world” example provided by the IIPA to 
highlight the point was that of having a lock to prevent opening a door to a house (the 
access control) which contained a book which upon entry I could read without 
infringing copyright.37  This view was said to have been endorsed in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the US. Critics of this approach had argued 
that such a broad ranging definition of TPM introduced a new form of economic 
exploitation over information called an “access right”. At no point in time did the 
IIPA submission suggest that an access control should regulate “use” of copyright 
material that had already been copied.  As well, the IIPA argued on the basis that the 
law reform being undertaken at that time related to the WCT and WPPT – both 
treaties dealing with copyright and convened by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation.  The IIPA’s preferred definition of an effective TPM is the same as the 
one offered in art 17.4.7 of AUSFTA and the DMCA. 
 
  
The AUSFTA Obligations – Already Enacted  
 
The AUSFTA has already been implemented in part through the US Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) which came into effect on 1 January 2005. 
Article 17.4.1 of AUSFTA obliges Australia to enact laws allowing copyright owners 
the right to prohibit all types of reproduction, in any manner or form, permanent or 
temporary. The US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) amends the 
definition of ‘material form’ and ‘copy’ in section 10 of the Act and creates an 
exception to infringement where the reproduction is made as part of the technical 
process of using a non-infringing copy of the copyright material (see ss 43B and 
111B). The critical difference being that temporary reproduction of a whole or 
substantial part of a computer program (game) or film (game) in RAM generated from 
an infringing copy of the copyright material will be unlawful. This will most likely 
mean that the arguments made by Sony concerning reproduction in RAM will be 
upheld in the case of infringing material.  The decision would remain intact in relation 
to non-infringing material namely games purchased overseas and possibly back up 
copies.  
 
Will the Further Changes Required by AUSFTA mean Regional Access Coding 
is now a TPM? 
                                                 
36 S Metalitz , 7.10.1999, pages 3-5 
  http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/submiss.htm 
37 S Metalitz, Public Hearing 21.10.1999 pages 176-177 
 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/digitalagenda/pubhear.htm 
The clear intent of the AUSFTA evidenced in art 17.4.7 is to bring Australian anti-
circumvention law into line with that in the US through making actual anti-
circumvention of an access control unlawful38 and moving the definition of TPM from 
one that “prevents or inhibits infringement of copyright” to one that “controls access” 
to protected subject matter.39  
Art 17.4.7 of AUSFTA requires that: 
7. (a) In order to provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that authors, performers, and producers of 
phonograms use in connection with the exercise of their rights and that restrict unauthorised 
acts in respect of their works, performances, and phonograms, each Party shall provide that 
any person who: 
(i) knowingly, or having reasonable grounds to know, circumvents without authority any 
effective technological measure that controls access to a protected work, performance, or 
phonogram, or other subject matter; or 
(ii) manufactures, imports, distributes, offers to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in 
devices, products, or components, or offers to the public, or provides services that: 
(A) are promoted, advertised, or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of any effective 
technological measure; 
(B) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent any 
effective technological measure; or 
(C) are primarily designed, produced, or performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating 
the circumvention of any effective technological measure, 
shall be liable and subject to the remedies specified in Article 17.11.13. Each Party shall 
provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied where any person is found to have 
engaged wilfully and for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain in any of the 
above activities. Each Party may provide that such criminal procedures and penalties do not 
apply to a non-profit library, archive, educational institution, or public non-commercial 
broadcasting entity. 
                                                 
38 On the possible exceptions see: AUSFTA art 17.4.7 (e) & (f). 
 
39 “There are two elements involved in implementing the TPM obligation. The first element is the 
development of amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 to ensure compliance with Article 17.4.7. The 
second element involves a determination of whether there are additional exceptions to TPM liability 
that would be appropriate for Australia to create. The Attorney-General’s Department is currently 
undertaking the first element. At the request of the Attorney-General, the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the Committee) will undertake the second 
element. The Committee announced this reference on Wednesday 24 August 2005. Information about 
the reference can be accessed at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/previnq.htm. AG’s 
Newsletter August 2005” 
 http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/enewsCopyrightHome.nsf/Page/eNews_Issue_37_-_August_2005 
 
(b) Effective technological measure means any technology, device, or component that, in the 
normal course of its operation, controls access to a protected work, performance, phonogram, 
or other protected subject matter, or protects any copyright.40   
The critical question concerning the continued relevance of the Stevens v Sony 
reasoning will be whether the amended Australian law will equate “access” with 
“use”.  If “controls access” means for example controlling access to copyright subject 
matter before any act of using, reproduction or communication occurs then the 
Stevens v Sony reasoning will remain important, as regional access coding does not 
“control access” before the relevant act. It does not stop someone being able to access 
the copyright subject matter for the purpose of using, copying or communicating it. 
This approach fits well with the argument proposed by the IIPA that access should be 
decoupled from the activity that goes on after access is achieved; access is merely the 
lock on the door.  It does not concern itself with any activity (e.g. use)41 that will 
occur after access has been achieved. However if  “controls access” means for 
example the right to control use or playing of a game on a PlayStation after access to 
copyright subject matter has been achieved then the Stevens v Sony reasoning will be 
of limited application.42   
                                                 
40 Consider:  DMCA s 1201 (a) (1) (2) & (3) 
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any 
technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that— (A) is primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under this title;  
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or  
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person’s 
knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.  
(3) As used in this subsection— (A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to descramble a 
scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or 
impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner; and  
(B) a technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the measure, in the ordinary 
course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the 
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.  
 
 
41 On one view it might be argued that you have not achieved access to a PlayStation game if you 
cannot play it on the console you have purchased.  It is hard to justify such an approach as it ignores 
the fact that once access is established a consumer can use modified technology to play the game. If 
they could not achieve access to the game in the first place there would be nothing that could be done 
to enable use. By trying to draw the legality of the modified technology into the definition of access the 
proponents of this view are extending the notion of access control (having its origins in copyright law) 
to a broader right to control use (having significant impact on consumer law).  
42 On this interpretation see, Sony v Gamemasters 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999): 
“39. Defendant concedes in its opposition papers that "[t]he Game Enhancer makes temporary 
modifications to the [PlayStation] computer program ... [c]hanging these codes with the Game 
Enhancer does not alter the underlying software made by SONY." (Def. Opp. at 6). Based upon the 
declarations before this Court, the Game Enhancer's distinguishing feature appears to be its ability to 
allow consumers to play import or non-territorial SCEA video games. As discussed above, SCEA 
specifically designed the PlayStation console to access only those games with data codes that match 
the geographical location of the game console itself. The Game Enhancer circumvents the mechanism 
on the PlayStation console that ensures the console operates only when encrypted data is read from an 
authorized CD-ROM. (Pltf's Reply at 7). Thus, at this stage, the Game Enhancer appears to be a device 
whose primary function is to circumvent "a technological measure (or a protection afforded by a 
technological measure) that effectively controls access to a system protected by a registered 
copyright...." 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A). (Emphasis added)” See also Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne 
 
The very great fear is that as software inhabits an enormous number of the consumer 
goods we purchase in this day and age there is tremendous scope for embedding 
TPMs in all kinds of products and thereby radically redefining the parameters of a 
sale of goods or services.  If TPMs as protected by anti-circumvention law can be 
used to structure the scope/usability of the product through code or technology then 
what the consumer is buying may not be readily apparent and worse still, may not 
allow choice of or interoperability with other accessories.43 
 
If the definition of a TPM is to move from “prevent or inhibit copyright infringement” 
to “controls access” meaning “controls use” then we have not only legislated an 
access right in our copyright law but we have also legislated a far reaching right to 
control and define consumer use.  This would be better placed in our consumer 
legislation and assessed in that light than articulated and justified as an aspect of 
copyright law. The AUSFTA in essence acknowledges such a point in art 17.4.7 (d).44 
 
As Australia has moved to open up the flow of goods and services across borders in 
line with free trade principles through the removal on the restrictions on parallel 
importation of copyright material in certain circumstances it seems odd that the 
AUSFTA should be interpreted as promoting the reintroduction of such barriers 
through technology. The barrier that law has taken away AUSFTA is threatening to 
reintroduce through technological regulation.   
 
Constitutional and statutory interpretation principle/s and international free trade 
principles suggest that “controls access” should not be given a broad interpretation so 
as to include use. In this way the fundamental reasoning and logic of Stevens v Sony 
would prevail and Australian consumers would be more secure in understanding what 
they are buying and allowed a broader choice and interoperability of accessories.   
Some will still argue that to be able to segment markets across the world through 
price differentiation is not bad in economics nor in anti-trust or competition law. 
However once we have removed parallel importation restrictions and recognise that 
digital content can be distributed cheaply and efficiently across the globe in an instant, 
arguments taking us back to segmented markets reinforced through technology are not 
appealing.  Arguments suggesting the cost of distribution in Australian are so high 
                                                                                                                                            
and Heydon JJ in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entertainment [2005] HCA 58 at 
[43]where they say “The mod chip is utilised for a different purpose, namely to access the reproduced 
computer program and thereafter visually to apprehend the result of the exercise of the functions of the 
program.” (Emphasis added). 
 
43 The Chamberlain Group Inc v Skylink Technologies Inc  381 F.3d 1178 at 1203, 1204 (Fed Cir. 
2004); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,  387 F.3d 522; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27422 (6th Cir 2004); B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the 
Digital Consumer’s Liberty or Copyright Menace/Circumvention Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89  
 
44 AUSFTA art 17.4.7 (d): Each Party shall provide that a violation of a measure implementing this 
paragraph is a separate civil or criminal offence and independent of any infringement that might occur 
under the Party’s copyright law. 
 
that a differential pricing structure is needed to make such distribution efficient are 
questionable in light of the increasing capacity to distribute online in a cost effective 
manner.  
 
The lifting of parallel importation restrictions were meant to liberate us from the 
imperialism that British and US publishers have forced on us for many generations.45 
Why would we entertain the return to such imperialism in a digital environment that 
allows Australian consumers the possibility of immediate access to a global 
distribution market for the very first time?  Today we can buy direct from New York 
and have it delivered via the Internet. Why should technology be allowed to stultify 
this and force us back to a situation where we buy the Australian edition at a marked 
up price? 
 
Ultimately any TPM that is designed like regional coding to segment markets in 
digital entertainment products should not be reinforced by anti-circumvention law so 
as to make Australian consumers second class citizens in a global market.   It is 
almost unthinkable that a copyright treaty and a copyright chapter in an FTA could 
end up being implemented in domestic law to the effect that the consumer’s liberty is 
restricted by preventing them from using games lawfully acquired in New York on 
the games console purchased in Australia. That would be both frightening and 
outrageous.    
 
Kirby J in Stevens v Sony questions whether such an enactment would be 
constitutional.46 Parliament would act to legislate these amendments under the 
intellectual property power s 51 (18) and/or the external affairs power s 51 (29) 
(implementing the WCT47, WPPT and AUSFTA) with other powers such as the trade 
and commerce power or the corporations power having potential relevance. Any 
inherent limits found in the intellectual property power (as yet undefined by the High 
Court)48 or the guarantee of compensation (“just terms”) for acquisition of property 
under s 51 (31) would be the obvious constitutional limits.49  Section 51 (31) would 
have particular relevance where property rights to chattels have already vested and the 
AUSFTA amendments purport to reduce the value (through functionality) of such 
chattels to the benefit of the copyright owner.50   
 
 
                                                 
45 Consider the excellent overview of the history and context of Australian copyright law by Benedict 
Atkinson: “Copyright Law in Australia 1905-1968: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and the Challenge of 
the Historical Record” (Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Sydney, 2002) 
46 At [216] 
47 E.g. Art 11 WCT:  Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict 
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law. 
 
48 See: Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth [2000] HCA 14 at f/n 218 per Kirby J 
49 See further: B Fitzgerald, “The Playstation Mod Chip: A Technological Guarantee of the Digital 
Consumer’s Liberty or Copyright Menace/Circumvention Device?” 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp An earlier and shorter version of this paper 
appears in (2005) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 89; B Fitzgerald, “Unjust Enrichment As A Principle 
of Australian Constitutionalism” (1995) available at 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp   
50 Consider: Kirby J in Stevens v Sony at [216] 
Conclusion: The Limits of TPMS 
 
The critical issue for Australia is to ensure that the implementation of the AUSFTA 
obligations does not result in the reinforcing of TPMs that deny Australian consumers 
their legitimate rights to participate in the global market for digital entertainment 
products. Stevens v Sony highlights for the very first time the need to bring into the 
balance and reconcile the fundamental rights of consumers with those of copyright 
owners. The next great battle in this digital copyright war will not necessarily be 
between pirates and copyright owners but between the digital liberties of the everyday 
Australian consumer and the increasing reach of copyright owners in the form of 
multi-national corporations. 
 
My point is that if the definition of technological protection measure is amended to 
focus on “controls access” and this is equated to “controls use” then the liberties of 
Australian consumers will be radically altered by this legislation which serves to 
implement a part of the AUSFTA designated “Intellectual Property”.  The recent 
decision in Stevens v Sony has guaranteed Australian consumers a fair degree of 
liberty in the face of imperialistic regional coding restrictions.  Will this significant 
decision reinforcing the liberties of Australian consumers be made redundant by the 
Australian Parliament’s actions?  
 
If TPM means “controls use” then we have entered a whole new dimension in which 
the interests of Australian consumers risk being subjugated to the needs of powerful 
multi-national corporations. In that situation the strongest consideration needs to be 
given to the exceptions that will apply to ameliorate this impact.  My suggestion is 
that the Australian Parliament should clearly articulate the view that “controls access” 
do not reach so far as to “control use” of consumer products.  We need to “unlock” 
the digital environment through interoperability and choice not suffocate it through an 
ill defined and unprincipled “grab” for control over the liberty of Australian 
consumers.   
 
At the end of the day the balanced definition of TPM will represent a part of what I 
term “digital constitutionalism”51 and be fundamental in ensuring the emerging yet 
vitally important principle of “digital liberty”.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
51 B. Fitzgerald (ed) Cyberlaw Volume 1 (2005) Ashgate London; B. Fitzgerald, “Software as 
Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture” (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 382–5;  Paul Schiff Berman “Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The 
Cultural  Values of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private’ Regulation’” (2000) 71 University of  
Colorado Law Review 1263; Jack M. Balkin “Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play  
in Virtual Worlds” (2004) 90 Virginia Law Review 2043; B Fitzgerald “Principles of Australian 
Constitutionalism” (1994) 1 (2) Proceedings of the 49th ALTA Conference 799; B Fitzgerald 
“Australian Constitutionalism” (20/6/97 Unpublished Manuscript on file with author); A Hutchinson, 
Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights  (1995) University of Toronto Press, Toronto;  Associated 
Press v US 326 US 1, 20.  See further A Giddens, The Constitution of Society (1984) Polity Press, 
Cambridge; Alan Hunt Foucault and law: towards a sociology of law as governance (1994) Pluto Press, 
London; E Ehrlich Fundamental Principles of Sociology of Law (1936) trans. By WL Moll (NY: Arno 
Press edn 1975).   
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